Monday, 17 August 2015


Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars
DateAugust – 23 September 1965
LocationSouth Asia
 India Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
India Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
(President of India)
India Lal Bahadur Shastri
(Prime Minister of India)
 J.N Chaudhuri
(Chief of the Army Staff)
 Lt.Gen. Harbaksh Singh
(Western Army Command)
 ACM Arjan Singh
(Chief of the Air Staff)
 Maj.Gen. Gurbaksh Singh
(GOC, 15th Infantry Division)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Brig. Z.C.Bakhshi
 Ayub Khan
(President of Pakistan)
 Gen Muhammad Musa
(Chief of Army Staff)
 AM Noor Khan
(Chief of Air Staff)
 Adm S.M. Ahsan
(Chief of Naval Staff)
 LGen Bakhtiar Rana
(Commander, I Corps)
 MGen Tikka Khan
(GOC12th Regiment Artillery)
 MGen A.H. Malik
(GOC12th Army Infantry)
 MGen Iftikhar Janjua
 BGen A.A. Malik
(24th Army Infantry)
 Cdre S.M. Anwar
(Commander, 25th Navy Group)
700,000 Infantry[2]
720 Tanks[2]
628 Artillery[3]
260,000 Infantry[2]
756 Tanks[3]
552 Artillery[3]
  • 72x105mm How[3]
  • 234X25pdr[3]
  • 126x155mm How[3]
  • 48x8" How[3]
  • 72x3.7" How[3]
  • POK Lt Btys[3]
Casualties and losses
Neutral claims[4][5]
Indian claims
  • 75 aircraft lost [9]
  • 322 km2 territory lost[10]
Pakistani claims
  • 8,200 men killed or captured[10]
  • 110[11]-113[10] aircraft destroyed
  • 500 tanks captured or destroyed [10]
  • 2602,[12] 2575 km2[10]territory gained
Neutral claims[4]
Pakistani claims
  • 19 aircraft lost[11]
Indian claims
  • 5259 men killed or captured [10]
  • 43[14] -73 aircraft destroyed [10]
  • 471 tanks destroyed [10]
  • 1920,[15] 1078 km2 [10]gained
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India.
This war started following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and also witnessed the largest tank battle since World War II. The hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared following diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and USA and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[16] Both India and Pakistan claimed victory. However, most neutral assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared.[17][18][19][20][21]
Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the International Border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of British India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear.[1] In Pakistan, following the incident, defence day is celebrated on 6 September.[22]

Pre-war escalation

A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.
Since Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area.[23] Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965.[23][24] Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (910 km2) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3,500 square miles (9,100 km2).[25]
After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory ofKashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962.[1] Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar.[26] The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris,[27] and the operation ended unsuccessfully.

The war

On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August.[1]

Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Musavisiting the captured KhemkaranRailway Station, India
Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as TithwalUri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir.[28]
On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place"[29][30][31] although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass.[29][32] Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.

Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.
India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September, marking an official beginning of the war.[33] On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[34] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[35] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

Destroyed or abandoned Pakistani Patton and Sherman tanks on display near Khem Karan. About 97 Pakistani tanks were either destroyed or captured by India during the Battle of Asal Uttar.[36][37]
On 8 September 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.[38]
On the days following 9 September, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.
The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning – "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.
The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 758.9 miles² (1,920 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian territory.[39] The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[40][41] while Pakistani land gains were primarily south in deserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumb sector near Kashmir in north.[42]

Aerial warfare

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.
The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnatsde Havilland VampiresEE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict, the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1.[43]
The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF's MiG-21Hawker Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF counterpart, the F-86 Sabre.[44] Although the IAF's de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who led the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war.
According to the Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer."[45] The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region."[46] In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[47][48] Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted bySquadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the Pakistan Army. The pilot claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he could get some chance on that, the Starfighters snuffed it.[49][50] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, KarachiSqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting.[50]

Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Gallery.
The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59.[51] According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[52]
Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from IndonesiaIraqIranTurkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.[citation needed] But this could be explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF.[44]
"India retained much of its air force in the East, against the possibility of Chinese intervention, and as a result the air forces were quite evenly balanced in the West."[53]
"The PAF lost some 25 aircraft (11 in air combat), while the Indians lost 60 (25 in air combat). This was an impressive result, but it was simply not good enough. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority.[53] According to Kenneth Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did well in the conflict and probably had the edge".[54] When hostilities broke out, the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F-86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft; the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a "decade's experience with the Sabre" and pilots with long flight hours experience. One Pakistani fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute, becoming the first known flying ace since the Korean War.[54]

Tank battles

Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[55] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[56] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[57]
At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.
The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[58] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive onAmritsar;[59][60] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.
After Indians breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially.[29] Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[61] Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.
The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.[60] However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse.[citation needed]

Naval hostilities

Further information: Operation Dwarka
Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal down of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (320 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war[62][63][64] contested as a nuisance raid by some.[65][66] The attack on Dwarka caused the Indian Navy led to questions being asked in India's parliament[67] and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores.[68]
According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[69] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.[70]

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[71] On 7 September 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff GeneralMuhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (HalwaraPathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[71] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians.[citation needed] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.[72]
Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[73]
India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.[74] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[72] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.[75]

Assessment of losses

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.
Indian claims[76]Pakistani claims[77]Independent Sources[1][78]
Casualties – –3,000 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani soldiers
Combat flying effort4,073+ combat sorties2,279 combat sorties
Aircraft lost59 IAF (official), 43 PAF.[9] In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down.[79]19 PAF, 104 IAF20 PAF, 60-75 IAF; Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration.[80][81]
Aerial victories17 + 3 (post war)30 –
Tanks destroyed128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured[82]165 Pakistan tanks[dubious ][citation needed]
Land area won1,500 sq mi (3,900 km2) of Pakistani territory250 sq mi (650 km2) of Indian territoryIndia held 710 sq mi (1,800 km2) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 sq mi (540 km2) of Indian territory

Pakistan lost 4 major wars to India, analyzing the 1965 war victory of India 
Shri Lal Bahadur ShastriPrime Minister of India ordered the Indian Army to cross the international border in Punjab and launch a two pronged attack on Pakistan. It was a magnificent master stroke of high level strategy that broke the back of the attacking forces of Pakistan in the Chhamb-Akhnoorsector of Jammu & Kashmir. The wily attackers had no choice but to withdraw from their winning position and rush to the defence of their homeland – Punjab. Shastri Ji's strategic move to cross the international borders and attack towards Lahore and Sialkot was indeed a Game Changer.
Pakistan Army, thereafter, could never achieve its Aim of War to wrest Kashmir by force and annex it with Pakistan. That was a long cherished dream of their founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It may be recalled that Jinnah's dreams were dashed in 1947 when the Indian Army had landed at the Srinagarairport to turn the tide and stop the attacking Pakistan tribals commanded by regular Pakistan army officers in their tracks. Jinnah kept waiting at Abbotabad cantonment for a green signal from his army to move ceremonially into Srinagar to accept the surrender of the representatives of the Hindu Dogra ruler, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh Ji but returned home deeply disappointed.
Pakistan's military rulers had made the Himalayan blunder of underestimating the will power of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the fighting capability of the Indian Army. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan made the greatest mistake of his life by launching Operation Gibraltar and sending thousands of his army soldiers into Kashmir in disguise in the summer of 1965, to sabotage lines of communications of the Indian Army and incite theKashmiri Muslims to rise in revolt against occupation of their homeland by the Hindus of Indian Army. The AIM was not achieved as the said operation failed to take off. In fact the local Kashmiri kissans and Gujjar cowherds were the first ones to inform the Indian Army of the massive enemy infiltration. Their element of surprise was lost and their Operation Gibraltar collapsed like a house of cards.
General Ayub Khan, then President of Pakistan made the second major mistake of launching Operation Grand Slam. Their tanks and crack infantry regiments were ordered to cross Chhamb-Jaurian and capture Akhnoor to fan out in the plains of Jammu and cut the vital lines of communications and Supply of the Indian Army located in J&K. His supposed master move was to paralyze the Indian Army by starving them of rations, ammunition and weaponry, not forgetting reinforcements.
The Pakistan Army initially met with major successes as their armour cut deep into the Indian territory. Gen Ayub Khan had issued a special Order of the Day congratulating Generals, officers and troops of his army on their major military achievements. The Indian Air Force fighter jets were not a bugbear to their tanks as the old time planes were shot down. " You have pierced the enemy flesh with your teeth, bite deep and let him bleed", said old Ayub in one of his statements to his soldiers.
And yet for no rhyme or reason Gen Ayub Khan made a major mistake of his military career. He ordered a change of command at their advancing infantry division level by replacing the GOC and putting Major General Yahya Khan in saddle. The change of command halted the fast pace forward and there was a period of inaction for a day plus. It gave times to the Indian generals to regroup their forces and tie their loose ends. It remains unexplained why Gen Ayub Khan changed the General Officer Commanding of the strike division at a crucial moment.
The morale of the Indian soldiers in the Akhnoor area was rather low. They did not perceive any major reinforcement coming from India nor was there any material change in the battle plan. The civil population was also perplexed. They had never anticipated such ferocious attack from Pakistan, an underdog until then. What had emboldened Pakistan's planners and executors was their information that the Indian Army was incapable of fighting against Pakistan. Its disastrous defeat in the 1962 India-China war and running away from battle of both officers and soldiers was a proof of lack of training and poor quality of weapon system. Although some mistakes had been rectified between 1962 and 1965 but that was not perceived to be enough to make them fighting fit.
Pakistan, on the other hand, had been preparing for a war with India for quite some time to avenge their failure in J&K in 1947-48. They had joined CENTO and SEATO and the USA poured military armaments much more than what Pakis needed. The US strategists had organized a seminar to assess the military situation in South Asia where the consensus was that should there be a military engagement in South Asia, Pakistan was sure to defeat India.
Pakistan Army officers had been brainwashing their junior commissioned officers and Jawans with the concept that man to man a Pakistani soldier was miles ahead of an Indian soldier. It was indeed a morale booster for the Pakistan Army. But their officers had overplayed their hand in this game of cards.
A diminutive figure physically but Rishi- size mentally and saint like spiritually, Lal Bahadur Shastri had an humble beginning but drew on his reserve of honesty, tenacity, perseverance and problem solving. Never say DIE was his motto and he lived by it. WILL TO WIN was a trait of his character and mental personality. No wonder he made it to the high office of Prime Minister of India and made an impact on the history of the Indian sub-continent.
General Ayub Khan had failed to assess his adversary, Shastri Ji. Shastri Ji was a votary of AHIMSA but once it came to killing the enemy to defend the motherland, he was second to none. Both Ayub and later Yahya made a mistake in assessing the fighting spirit of the HINDU soldier and what they mistakenly called Hindu India. With the result the puffed up generals across the border lost all the wars they fought against "Hindu India".
The Indian nation had great confidence in its national leader, Lal Bahadur Shastri. When USA made a veiled threat of stopping grain supply under PL 480, Shastri Ji advised the Nation to miss a meal once a week and more often, if need be. Like a good leader, he followed his own advice. It inspired all Indians to acquire moral courage, a quality that had enriched personality of the diminutive man.
No wonder Shastri Ji ordered the Indian Army to cross the international borders and launch a two pronged attack on the enemy country. He achieved success. When departing for Tashkent to attend the peace negotiations with Pakistan after the war was over, a journalist asked him," Sir, you are short statured but President Ayub is so tall, how would you face him?" Shastri Ji's prompt reply in Hindi was: " Wo sar jhuka kar baat kreinge aur main sar utha kar baat karunga". The questioner was left speechless.
Many a time the question crops up; who won, who lost. In any case both Bharat and Pakistan are celebrating their Victory Day on 6th September 2015. It was 50 years ago that India had launched its forces across borders towards Lahore and Sialkot. They fought for 22 days when the Security Council of the United Nations brokered Peace and ordered a Ceasefire on 23 Sep 65 at 0330 hrs.
Going by territorial gains, India had won 720 sq miles of Pakistan. The enemy had captured about 400 sq miles of the Indian territory. Casualty on Indian side was, 30,000 whereas on their side it was 30800. Who knocked out how many tanks is a much debated point. However, all agree that after WWII, Chhawinda and Asal Uttar were the two biggest tanks battles of the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The graveyard of Paki Patton tank in the Khemkaran area is a glaring proof of incapacity of American tanks to win a war. One may emphasis again that it is the Man behind the gun and not the GUN that becomes a battle winning factor.
Gallantry awards were given to the Brave hearts by both the countries. India honoured one officer and one Jawan with Param Vir Chakra, the highest gallantry award for displaying extra-ordinary bravery above the call of duty in the face of the enemy. Pakistan gave one award of this nature.
Let us assess what was the aim of Pakistan when they launched Operation Gibraltar and operation Grand Slam? Pakistan wanted to snatch Kashmir from India and make it a part of Pakistan. Did they succeed in their AIM? The answer is a big NO. What was India's aim in going to war against Pakistan? Well, to defend every inch of India and not let Pakistan wrest any part of India. Did India succeed in achieving its aim? The answer is a big YES.
India won the war and Pakistan lost.
Editorial NOTE: This article is categorized under Opinion Section. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of In case you have a opposing view, please click here to share the same in the comments section.
Indian soldiers celebrating their victory



- See more at:

Neutral assessments

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
  • TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi2 of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily.[83] The article further elaborates,
Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.
  • Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics"[18] –
The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.
  • In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions",[84] Gertjan Dijkink writes –
The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.
In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.
  • In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote[7] –
India won the war. It gained 1,840 km2 (710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory: 640 km2 (250 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km2 (180 sq mi) of the Sailkot sector; 380 km2 (150 sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km2 (140 sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km2 (210 sq mi) of Indian territory: 490 km2 (190 sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km2 (19 sq mi) around Khem Karan.
  • Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war,[86]
Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.
  • BBC reported that the war served game changer in Pakistani politics,[87]
The defeat in the 1965 war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. This became a surge after his protege, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, deserted him and established the Pakistan People's Party.
  • "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions[8] –
India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles (1,900 km2) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles (570 km2) of its own.
  • An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment"[88] –
A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.
  • English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war[89] –
The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.
  • Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan"[90] –
Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.
  • Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold off the much larger Indian Army.[91]
By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own.


The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now inUzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966.
With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent.[92] Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India bowed to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire.[92] On 22 September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.
India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.[93] The ceasefire was criticised by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.[94] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.[95] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory",[96] allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive".[97][98]
India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.[99] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On 10 October, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala.[100] A Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.
The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Intelligence failures

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate —

Indian miscalculations

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.
The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on 22 September when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.
Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.[76]

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.

Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."
The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second front. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir.
"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticised the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticised Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.[101]
Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win.[102][103] Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".[104]
Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war.[105][106] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan,[107][108] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

Involvement of other nations

Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.[109] However, following the start of the 1965 war, the United States was of the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault and therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country.[17] However, Pakistan did receive significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's Republic of China.[17] Support given by Indonesia to Pakistan is seen as a major failure of India's International Policy considering that the Indonesia was one of the founding members of Non-Aligned Movement along with India [110]
Both before and during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan. As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders.
India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Despite close relations with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host inTashkent.[111][112]



Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.[113] In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war[114] —
Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.
In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.[115]
While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticised for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.[116] In his book "War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates[117] —
India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.
As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.
China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.[118] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India.[119] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.[120] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy – India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.[121] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.[122] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.[123]


At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. 6 September is celebrated as Defence Day in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.
However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.[124] In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes[18] —
After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.
Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made.[125] Several Pakistani writers criticised the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war.[126][127] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote[128] –
The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.
Pakistan airforce on the other hand gained a lot of credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and international war writers for successful defence of lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India on the next day. The alertness of the airforce was also related to the fact that some pilots were scrambled 6 times in less than an hour on indication of Indian air raids. Pakistan airforce along with the army is celebrated for on Defence day and Airforce day in commemoration of this in Pakistan (6 and 7 September respectively).[44][129]
Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.[130][131][132]
Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticised the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticised in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticised. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces,[133] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub.[134] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.[87]
One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan.[135][136] The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during the early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.[137] According to veterns of the war, the war had greatly cost Pakistan economically, politically, and militarily.[138] Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military forces, and Pakistan's own position in international community, especially with the United States, began to deteriorated from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance with China was indeed improved.[138] Noted in the memoirs of war veteran, General Tariq Majid (later four-star general), Chou En-Lai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzus: "to go slow, not to push India hard; and avoid a fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20-30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power'."[138] General Majid maintained in Eating Grass, that the "sane, philosophical and political critical thinking" was missing in Pakistan, and Pakistan had lost a tremendous human resource that it had fought the war with India.[138]
Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. The US turned neutral in the war when it cut off military supplies to Pakistan (and India);[1] an action which the Pakistanis took as a sign of betrayal.[139] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.
Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),[104] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.[140] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.[141] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,[142] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.[143] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Military awards

Battle honours

After the war, a total of number of 16 battle honours and 3 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable amongst which are:[144]

Gallantry awards

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider:

See also

1965 Indo-Pak War Memorabilia

Wife of Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Receives Nishan-e-Haider on Her Husband’s Behalf. In an investiture ceremony, wife of Maj Raja Aziz Bhatti receives Nisha-e-Haider from President Ayub Khan on her husband’s behalf. Wife of Brig A.R. Shami is standing on her left. Brig Shami was awarded Hilal-e-Jurat (Posthumously).
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Wife of Major Raja Aziz Bhatti receives Nishan-e-Haider on her husband's behalf - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
 3rd Baluch Regiment Monument at Wagah, Lahore. 3rd Baluch Regiment Monument raised in the everlasting memory of the 39 men who got shahadat by defending our motherland in September 1965 War on the Wagha Sector-Batapur Bridge on the BRBL canal and the counter attack on 10/11 September 1965.
Photo taken by Brig Muhammad Ajmal (3rd Baluch) on 06 September 2010.  On that day Brig Ajmal’s son had led the Guard at the Monument. Brig Ajmal is from a family which has had three consecutive generations serving in 3rd Baluch. Photo shared by Naveed Tajammal (3rd Baluch).
1965 India-Pakistan War Memorabilia - 3rd Baluch Regiment Monument at Wagah - Photos and Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War
55 Indian Soldiers Captured by a Senior Helicopter Pilot. Lt Col Naseer Ullah Babar (Retired as Maj Gen) was a daring officer. He was commanding an Aviation Squadron during 1965 War. On 1 Sep 1965, he landed at an Indian post by mistake. He kept his cool and captured 55 Sikh soldiers . He was awarded Sitara-e-Jurat for this action.
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: 55 Sikh soldiers captured by Lt Col Naseer Ullah Babar, a Pakistani helicopter pilot:- Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War with India
Captured Indian Air Force Ouragan Aircraft. In June 1965, India and Pakistan had a border skirmish in the Rann of Kutch region. On 24 June 1965, an ndian Air Force (IAF) Ouragan fighter (Serial No. IC 698), flown by Flt. Lt. Rana Lal Chand Sikka intruded into Pakistani airspace. A Pakistan Air Force (PAF) F-104A Starfighter intercepted the IAF fighter near Badin in Sindh. Just as the PAF pilot locked on to the Indian fighter and was about to release his Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile, the Indian pilot lowered his aircraft’s landing gear (an internationally-recognized sign of aerial surrender). The IAF pilot landed at an open field near Jangshahi village near Badin. The IAF pilot was taken prisoner and released on 14 August 1965 – as a goodwill gesture on Pakistan’s Independence Day – minus the IAF Ouragan fighter, which was retained by the PAF as a trophy and flown by a PAF pilot to an airbase in Karachi.
Captured Indian Air Force Ouragan aircraft - Pictures/Memorabilia of Rann of Kutch Skirmish 1965
Surrender of Indian Air Force Gnat aircraft at Pasrur. On September 3, 1965, Squadron Leader Brijpal Singh Sikand, Commander of an Indian fighter squadron, surrendered to a PAF F-104 in an air combat.The Indian pilot landed the Gnat aircraft on Pasrur airfield near Gujranwala and was taken Prisoner of War.  The F-104 was flown by Flight Lieutenant Hakimullah who became the Air Chief two decades later. Sikand was later rose to be an IAF Air Marshal. This encounter was the most unusual event of the 1965 Air War. The Gnat is now on display at the PAF Museum Karachi.
Surrender of Indian Air Force Gnat fighter aircraft at Pasrur - Pictures/Memorabilia of 1965 Indo-Pak War
Tail of an Indian Canberra Bomber, Sahiwal: Tail of an Indian Canberra bomber shot down in the 1965 War and exhibited on public display in Sahiwal in 1969.
1965 Indo-Pak War Photos: Tail of Indian Canberra bomber displayed in Sahiwal - Pictures of 1965 India Pakistan War
Captured Indian tank, AMX-13, Displayed at Old Fort, Sialkot. Photo by .
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: A Captured Indian tank (AMX-13) is displayed at Old Fort, Sialkot - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Plaque of Captured Indian tank, AMX-13, at Old Fort, SialkotPhoto by .
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Plaque of a Captured Indian tank (AMX-13), at display at Old Fort, Sialkot - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
1965 Indo-Pak War: A Bogus Claim by Indian Army Chief. Headlines of The Indian Express newspaper about 1965 Indo-Pak War.
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: A Bogus claim by Indian Army Chief; Headlines of The Indian Express newspaper about 1965 Indo-Pak War - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
A Captured Indian Centurion Tank near Chawinda, Sep 1965. A party of journalists examining a Centurion tank left behind by Indians near Chawinda.
 An Indian captured Centurion tank near Chawinda 1965 - Pictures/Memorabilia of 1965 Indo-Pak War
People Gathered at Lahore in 1965 to See a Captured Indian Tank
 Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: People gathered at Lahore in 1965 to see a captured Indian tank - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War with India
President Ayub Khan and Shastri on the Cover of Time Magazine, September 17, 1965 Edition
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: General Ayub Khan and Shastri on the Cover of Time Magazine, September 17, 1965 Edition - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Headline of ‘The Australian’ Newspaper (13 September 1965 edition)
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: 'The Australian' newspaper (13 Sep 1965 edition) headline about Huge Tank Battle between Pakistan & India - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
The Australian Newspaper, 14 September 1965 EditionPakistan’s victory in the biggest tank battle since World War II.
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: The Australian newspaper, 14 September 1965 edition - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War with India
Captured Jeep of Indian Maj Gen Parsad (8 Sep 1965). Maj Gen Parsad, GOC 15th Indian Infantry Div, abandoned his Willys Jeep in the fields and ran away during a retaliatory attack by Pakistani forces. See his photo and more details in the subsequent paragraphs.
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Captured jeep of Indian Maj Gen Parsad  - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Jeep of Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, captured by 18 Baluch Regt on 8 September 1965. This was official jeep of Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15th Indian Infantry Division. It was captured by 18 Baloch Regt on 8 Sep 1965 at Wagah Sector (Lahore Sector) across the BRB Canal. The jeep is on display at the Quarter Guard of 18 Baluch Regt (now 3 Sind).
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Jeep of GOC 15th Indian Infantry Division, captured by Pakistani troops on 8 September 1965 - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Cowardice of Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15th Indian Infantry DivisionHere are some extracts from Chapter 8 (‘Of Cowardice and Panic’) of the book “1965 War, the Inside Story (Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan’s Diary of India-Pakistan War)”.
“Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad had generally a poor record in operational command. In NEFA during 1962 operations and later while commanding Infantry Division at Rajouri, he had been found deficient. Despite Harbaksh Singh requesting Gen Chaudhuri to replace him, the Chief disregarded the suggestion.
“Utter confusion prevailed in the operations of 15 Division and by the evening of 8 September, situation was indeed pathetic. The Divisional Commander had just managed to evade capture. The Commanding Officers of two battalions had lost mental balance and were unfit to lead their units. The Army Commander Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh had acted decisively and relieved the Division Commander and the two COs of their command.”
“On the basis of enquiry by GOC XI Corps. Niranjan Prasad was to face court-martial but the COAS sent for Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad and asked him to resign.”
Read the interesting details of abandoning of  jeep by GOC 15th Indian Infantry Division at Lahore Front on page 40 of the book: 1965 War: The Inside Story(Editor’s Note: The book has an error by calling the abandoned jeep as Jonga, designed by Nissan and built by India (See details of Jonga). But the above black & white and coloured photos clearly show that it was a Willys Jeep, built in the USA).
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Photo of GOC 15th Indian Infantry Division and his captured jeep - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War with India
Captured Indian Artillery Gun. A Pakistani JCO inspecting a captured Indian Artillery gun.
Captured Indian Artillery gun 1965 - Pictures/Memorabilia of 1965 Indo-Pak War1965 Indo-Pak War Mementos and Photos - Captured Indian Artillery gun 1965
25 Indian Artillery Guns Captured in Chhamb Sector
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: 25 Indian Artillery guns captured in Chhamb Sector in 1965 - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
An Abandoned Indian Tank at Chhamb Sector
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: An abandoned Indian tank at Chamb Sector in 1965 - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
A Destroyed Indian Tank in Chawinda
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: A destroyed Indian tank in Chawinda in 1965 - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Two captured Indian AMX-13 Tanks, 1965Two captured Indian AMX-13 tanks with Pakistani soldiers.
Two captured Indian AMX-13 tanks 1965 - Pictures/Memorabilia of 1965 Indo-Pak War
An Pakistani Soldier at Guard Near the Milestone (KM Stone) in the Captured Indian Town of Khemkaran 
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War:An alert Pakistani soldier in the captured Indian town of Khemkaran near the mile stone - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Kishangarh Fort Captured by Pakistan Army 
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Kishangarh Fort captured by Pakistan Army and Pakistani flag hoisted - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Pakistani Flag at Kishangarh Fort in 1965 
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Pakistani flag at captured Kishangarh Fort in 1965 - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
A Pakistani Soldier at Munabao Railway StationMunabao was an important railway station of Rajhistan was captured by Pakistan during 1965 Indo Pak War. India persistently denied that it was not captured by Pakistani forces.
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: A Pakistani soldier at the captured Munabao Railway Station - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Munabao Railway Station in Rajhistan Captured by Pakistan
 Munabao Railway Station in Rajhistan captured by Pakistan 1965 - Pictures/Memorabilia of 1965 Indo-Pak War
Indo-Pak War, September 1965 (Dawn, Karachi: Rare Newspaper)
Mementos of 1965 Indo-Pak War: Indo-Pak War, September 1965 (Dawn, Karachi: Rare Newspaper) - Memorabilia (Photos & Mementos) of 1965 War
Indo-Pak War, September 1965 (Daily Jang, Karachi, Edition of 7 Sep 1965)
Rare Newspapers - Indo-Pak War September 1965 - Daily Jang, Karachi 07 September 1965

Editor’s Note: If it is not inconvenient, please do write a brief comment at the end of this page under the heading Leave a Reply here”.
If you have liked this page, then please share it on FacebookTwitter or any other social media.
You may also contribute photos of 1965 War by sending to the Editor


  1. vinay singh says:
    Pakistani always got defeat from india but shamelessly come again..see in 1965 khemkaran we destroyed paki-us tanks in huge numbers & its known as graveyard of paki longewala we killed them thy always believe in lie..
  2. Asim Nazir says:
    Dear Rahul Singh,
    You may have maximum number of soldiers, Aircraft, Guns, etc, But during war only the things which work are Devotion, Passion & Faith. You believe in your weapons, we only believe in our ALLAH.
    Just imagine, if your all weapons don’t work at the day of the war, what you will do?
  3. Abb larr lay India hamaray say, jo kehtay thay subah kay nashta Lahore mein siri paye ka ho ga…..
    jo subah ka nashta Lahore karnay chalay thay woh zindagi bhar ka khana bhool gaye….
  4. Ankit Tiwari says:
    Is there any reason why Wikipedia says India won and why whole world is saying that India defeated Pakistan in 4 wars? We even won a battle with China in 1962 and we got Sikkim which is now a state of India and don’t forget that 1/4th territory was given back to Pakistan by Indira Gandhi.
    Nehru went to UNO other wise we would have got whole of Kashmir in 1948, check even on YouTube or any other website, we reached in with tanks where you couldn’t even carry enough ammunition.
    In Kargil Conflict we faced huge casualties but we won.
    In Siachin could Pakistan do anything? NO.
    It usually happens in wars that both counties capture some tanks, some crashed planes and some guns. It doesn’t mean that they are brave. Pakistanis should come to Delhi Cantt and you will find lines of Pakistani tanks and planes.
    Surf the Internet and newspapers a bit more, check out Longewala Battle.
    • Azad Pakistani says:
      In order to command a justification of reliability, it would be vital to evaluate the end states or what were the strategic gains and what were the strategic loss. Achievement of mission or aims or denying the opponents aims and objectives is another barometer.
      1. Let us begin with 1948 War; The Kashmir Issue has been universally recognized as an unresolved dispute subject to will of Kashmirs. It will remain so in UN mandate whether India claims victory or otherwise. Indian claim of Kashmir being an inseparable part has been contradicted effectively.
      2. 1962 Run of Kuch; who has the Run of Kuch now is the victor.
      3. 1962 Indo- China War; ask from the Indian Army, they are still discussing this as a humiliating defeat.
      4. 1971 War; India certainly won that war and achieved the aims and objectives convincingly.
      5. Siachin Conflict; India did occupy an un-manned part through surprise but could not achieve the main objective of cutting Baltistan from rest of Pakistan. Even now India feels that it was a futile effort and was launched for egoistic objectives and did not serve any strategic gains to India in the long run.
      6. Kargil Conflict; Pakistan achieved its purpose of boosting Kashmir as nuclear flash point and asserted in internationalization the Kashmir Issue.
      you may like to reexamine the factual situations please.
      On the overall, India went to war to get Kashmir resolved and subjugate Pakistan, has she succeeded?
      Pakistan went to war to reassert Kashmir issue and to challenge hegemony of India. Has Pakistan achieved or not; you be the judge.
      Thank you.
    • Rafique Ahmed Khan says:
      Dear Mr. Ankit Tiwari,
      With reluctance I have to clear our position as follows:-
      India – a country of more than on billion population has only very big ever ailing headache and that is Pakistan, hardly with a population of 18 millions. In spite of invading four times, India starts licking its wounds every time being humiliated & failing miserably to achieve its target of defeating Pakistan and taking back a major portion of Kashmir which Pakistan rightfully annexed at the time of Partition.
      Though Pakistan gave back a major chunk of East Punjab which was annexed during the 1971 War as a gesture of good will. When unable to resist Pakistan on the war front in Kashmir, India regardless of her big size & status, did not feel ashamed to beg the UNO for help. Eventually Pakistan had to stop her advance in the battle field after being assured by UNO for thorough consideration of the settled referendum by the Kashmiris to choose the country of their choice. Instead of abiding by the UNO resolution for the necessary referendum India has lingered on with delaying tactics and offering various diplomatic funny excuses. Thus breaking shamelessly the International Laws and Regulations and her commitments in this regard.
      The Indians never felt obliged to the Muslims who served India for almost 1000 years maintaining law and order in the country and successfully keeping it in one piece, making roads & highways like the one from Peshawar to Calcutta with all the facilities like drinking water and hotels (Sraaeys) accompanied with the Stables for their horses and other animals, Hospitals (Matabs), Castles & Forts, Cantonments for the army to defend India from outside attacks, Compilation & Maintenance of Land records, Schools (Madrassas), enforced the Islamic constitution, a master piece of Justice and Laws.
      The Hindus developed instead a deep hatred and complex against the Muslims. Eventually after being unable to exist under the condition of being hated to the point of no return, obtained a homeland by dividing India. The division of India has become as ever bleeding & incurable wound for the Hindus unnecessarily.
      Since the partition India remains the cause of turbulence in the region Almost all your small neighbors, and the minorities living in India have the same feelings with your hostile attitude; which must be changed for the sake of peaceful atmosphere of the region and your own safety.
      To end, it would be appreciable if the Indians do not kick the bomb & compel the Muslims to be the second country after America & the Last country in the World to start a Nuclear war and wipe India from the map as a big chunk of non-sense and convert it into small fragments of Independent but self dependent countries like Europe, Balkan & Middle East.
    • Hasan Jawaid says:
      So far, most sensible Indian military leadership and analysts have stayed away from calling Pakistan a loser, it has been mostly Indian armed forces leadership that has been the subject of criticism of Indian military analysts and politicians for lack of preparedness and thoughtfulness. Indian libraries are replete with post 1965 to 1999 Kargil events, just spend some time in the library. To broach Indo-Pak wars, one needs to have a deeper understanding of military strategy, long term strategic vision, and how long term benefits are achieved by staging war(s)/conflicts that produce long lasting results – surfing internet on serious matters reflects amateurism and lack of professional knowledge.
      Not sure how much military philosophy and strategy you possess, my apologies for saying this, because your comment does not reflect that. I don’t consider it more than a prank wasting everyone’s time on frivolous discussion.
      However, if you are serious in knowing the conflicts’ outcomes, I suggest you read military philosopher Clausewitz and understand the long term strategic goals that underpin the purpose of wars. According to Clausewitz, ‘War is diplomacy carried out by other means’. It is fought to achieve political and military objectives and if it fails to achieve that, it loses the war. Let’s see if Pakistan has achieved its goals.
      One of Pakistan’s biggest achievements and a powerful message to India has been that wars are not won by sheer size/strength and equipment alone. Has India understood this? Sure thing, it has changed from being a swagger to simply hurling threats. The dream to dis-integrate Pakistan hasn’t been abandoned yet, but it will be soon.
      Just a little comment over 1971 War, creation of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) was not the result of Indian army’s doing; rather, it was Pakistan’s own political injustice and unfair system that led to this division. It was insurgency and anti-state activities that caused Pakistan to split, not Indian army as implied by you. You might want to question your army pundits why Indian army was unable to do anything during 1999 stand-off in Kargil, you wouldn’t be able to digest what they were up against. A colossal size army and not being able to scare army less than half its size, a question that your parliament needs to raise and
      as a novice you need to ponder over.
      Another monumental achievement that emerged out of these conflicts was Pakistan’s ability to build its strategic weapons – a remarkable strategic achievement over India. Go and ask your military strategists and pundits if they would want to engage even in locally contained conflicts, would love to hear their response.
      Although West has rescued you time and again but just go and ask your current Prime Minister if he has the guts to raise war slogans the way he did when he was running elections? Would love to hear what he has to say, but it sure wouldn’t be palatable to you and your like minded friends.

About 1,850 results (0.49 seconds) 
    Stay up to date on results for 1965 indo pak war kashmir outposts captured by indian troops.
    Create alert
    About 78,000 results (0.72 seconds) 

    1. 1947 Partition Archive - 1947 Partition witness accounts‎
      Join us. Share your Story. Donate.
      Kharghar, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra - From your Internet address - Use precise location
       - Learn more   

      1 comment: